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This paper provides evidences of the electoral influence on fiscal policy in the Eurozone 
countries. Using data from EA19 in 1995-2017 and a time dummy to identify election 
years, it was applied a Fixed Effects model to assess its impact on fiscal instruments. 
According to the results, the elections seem to increase both compensations to employees 
and other current expenditure. In addition, the politically motivated policies seem to differ 
from low and highly indebted countries. Giving the electoral impact on the compensation 
to employees, the pro-cyclical tax strategy, and the absence of a Ricardian fiscal regime, 
its perceived less prudent policies from the most indebted countries. Furthermore, after 
countries joined the EMU, policy makers began to increase tax burden facing interest rate 
shocks, since they lose the ability to manipulate monetary policy. 
 
Keywords: Political Budget Cycles, Fiscal policy, Elections, EMU, IV-GMM 
JEL Codes: D72; E12; E62; H62 
  
                                                          
* The usual disclaimer applies, and all remaining errors are the author sole responsibility. The opinions 
expressed herein are those of the author and not of his employer. 
1 ISEG – Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa; Ministry of Economy 




Given the high amounts of public debt accumulated in the majority of the western 
European countries during the last decades, and its impact on the recent policy making, 
on the risk premium and on people’s welfare, fiscal discipline and the sustainability of 
public debt became prominent issues nowadays. 
Following the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in order to provide 
fiscal robustness and stability, the Maastricht Treaty was signed, requesting a stringent 
supranational commitment. Thus, after 1992, there were a gradual loss of fiscal autonomy 
of the EU member states, due to the budget-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP criteria of 60% 
and 3%, that had to be met by the potential member states before their accession to the 
EMU and be sustained afterwards (Andrikopoulos et al., 2004).  
However, despite the constraints imposed by the European Authorities, the expansionist 
pro-cyclical policies remained sometimes observed (see Figure 1), eroding fiscal buffers.  
Among other reasons, the literature argues that this European deficit bias may come from 
opportunistically motivated electoral purposes, i.e. the existence of political budget 
cycles. As defined by Vergne (2009), the political budget cycles theory describes how 
fiscal policy affects the re-election probabilities of incumbent Governments.  
In this context, the present article aims to explain the impact of elections on fiscal policy, 
how it might affect the budget composition, and if it varies according to the debt level 
and to the EMU membership. Additional analyses were performed to controlling 
hypothetical endogeneity problems. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3 presents 
the data analysis and some statistical consideration, and Section 4 describes the 
methodology and the empirical assessment. Section 5 presents robustness estimations and 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Fiscal policy biases 
Government debt accumulation has increased significantly since the 1970s in the majority 
of the European countries, resulting from a deficit bias in fiscal policy-making, which 
created severe consequences to the most indebted economies during the economic crisis. 
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That indebtedness path and the policy debate regarding its inherent risks created the need 
of fiscal rules to provide fiscal discipline and to enable the creation of the single currency. 
(Krogstrup and Wyplosz, 2009).   
The Stability and Growth Pact and its underlying measures, was designed to constrain 
fiscal discretion in order to prevent national fiscal policies from having negative 
spillovers on other countries, to create fiscal buffers to enable the proper functioning of 
the automatic stabilizers (taxes and transfers) and to apply counter-cyclical policies.  
Thus, since 1992, member states have gradually lost some of their fiscal autonomy, due 
to the debt and deficit criteria that were expected to constraint national policies, regardless 
of ideological differences (Andrikopoulos et al., 2004). However, those criteria were 
broadly criticized for its asymmetric nature, restricting downswings but not upswings, 
and for its weak mechanisms to prevent politically motivated fiscal policies (Buti and 
Van den Noord, 2003). 
Despite the constraints imposed by the European Authorities, the pro-cyclical policies, 
i.e., fiscal expansions on positive output gaps or contractions on negative output gaps, are 
often observed. Then, facing recurrent expansionary bias and eroding fiscal buffers, pro-
cyclical austerity measures might become unavoidable. 
Figure 1 presents the fiscal policy biases in the Eurozone countries. The fiscal expansions 
or contractions are measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balances 












Figure 1 – Pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical fiscal policies in the EA19 (1995-2017) 
 
Sources: AMECO; authors’ estimates. 
Note: The sample includes 19 EA countries over 1995–2017. Outlier observations (above 6 percent and 
below −6 percent) are excluded to improve the visual representation of the scatterplot.  
 
As a consequence, the Eurozone countries showed high differences comparing to the 
Maastricht reference values for the stock of public debt and for the budget deficit as a 
share of GDP (60% and 3%, respectively).  
According to Figure 2, one can observe that, on average, the EA19 countries never 
achieved a debt-to-GDP ratio below the 60% and didn’t meet the balance-to-GDP criteria 







Figure 2 – Comparison against the budget-to-GDP (right axis) and debt-to-GDP 
criteria (EA19 average: 1995-2017) 
 
Sources: AMECO. 
The deficit biases, the debt accumulation and the criteria’s non-compliance might result, 
among other reasons, from political incentives during electoral years. 
 
2.2.The role of political motivations 
Democracy is an essential feature to provide political structures and has the power to 
induce better policies. The existence of free and regular competitive elections, incentives 
governments to be more efficient, weeding out incompetent politicians. However, despite 
the scrutiny and commitment given to the population, political parties, intending to renew 
their legitimacy, may have other goals during electoral periods (Vergne, 2009). 
In the past few decades, the economic literature has been studying the politically 
motivated policies, to better understand how politicians might manipulate their policies 
to increase the chances of re-election (Vergne, 2009; Buti and Van den Noord, 2003). 
The contributions pass through studies of electoral budget cycles (Rogoff and Sibert, 
1988), the analysis of the influence of political systems on the fiscal execution (Persson 




The political business cycle theory, based on market imperfections and information 
asymmetries, explains the consequences of elections. As argued in Eyraud et al. (2017), 
political economy factors create policy distortions that can result in suboptimal fiscal 
outcomes, namely trough pro-cyclical spending increases, using the fiscal space needed 
to stabilize the business cycles during downturns. Moreover, electoral incentives could 
lead to the maintenance of unproductive spending and increasing distortionary taxes, 
jeopardizing the economic growth. 
In Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) the political business cycles are split in electoral and 
partisan purposes. The authors argued that while electoral (opportunistic) cycles are 
characterized by key target and policy variables to reelect the incumbent government, 
regardless the ideological orientation, partisan cycles are conditioned by differences upon 
the ideology of the party in power and its competitors. Moreover, proportional political 
systems (where parties form coalition governments) are less prone to partisan cycles. 
Indeed, coalition governments tend to generate moderate policies but also to create larger 
budget deficits and build up government debt (Alesina et al., 1997). 
According to the literature, the politicians’ reelection and the partisan’s goals create 
incentives to use pre-election spending, investment promises and excessive revenue 
forecasts to support the electoral confidence. Due to the people’s imperfect understanding 
of financial issues, not perceiving the government intertemporal budget constraints, they 
would be excited by an available (disposable) income increase or better public services 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Debrun et al., 2009).  
However, the policy makers often deviate from their targets after elections, harming 
economic agents, who might have already adjusted their expectations and consumption. 
The literature also argues that electoral purposes, facing some lobby pressures, might lead 
to a “common pool” problem, i.e., an excessive spending to a particular group, while the 
costs would be spread over all the population (Eyraud et al., 2017).  
Indeed, some authors concluded that governments that damage the financial position 
reduce their chances of re-election, arguing that voters tend to be fiscally conservative, 





2.3.Effects on the composition of fiscal policy 
According to Buti and Van den Noord (2003) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), the 
literature predicts that facing an electoral period, policy makers tend to undertake short-
sighted policies and apply tax cuts before elections (supposedly without clear 
implications for government spending). Thus, discretionary policies are expected expand 
in pre-election and in election years, and a stronger economic growth is expected, 
resulting from the optimism on growth prospects. In fact, in non-electoral years, 
government appears to tight fiscal policy to create safety margins to support fiscal 
expansions in electoral years. However, the safety margin wasn’t enough in the Eurozone 
countries, leading them to exceed the 3% of GDP budget deficit ceiling. 
The political business cycles designed in Rogoff (1990), based on information 
asymmetries and where the votes depend on the consumption of private and public goods, 
gives insights on how the current expenditure might be manipulated during electoral 
periods. According to the model, the incumbent strategy will depend on i) the information 
asymmetry about its own competence, considering that citizens are uninformed about the 
development of incumbent’s skills and its advisors; and ii) the public investment level, 
since it will only be visible in the following years.  
However, the voters only observe current expenditure and taxes contemporaneously. In 
Vergne (2009) it’s argued that electoral factors have significant impacts on the allocation 
of public expenditure, shifting towards more visible current expenditure, such as wages 
and subsidies, instead of capital expenditures. Furthermore, in developing countries, 
whilst tax cuts have no significant impact on the voter’s opinion (since the tax base is 
small in those countries), the expenditure measures have a special role, having a very 
direct and immediate impact on people’s welfare. 
The organized interest groups also play a role on the political business cycles, namely, to 
finance the electoral campaigns and to mobilize the citizens (Grossman and Helpman, 
1996). According to the public expenditure targeting models, in order to conquer the 
lobbies’ support, the incumbent government has the incentive to target investment 
expenditure to specific groups (instead of focus on proving its competence) (Drazen and 
Eslava, 2005). According to Vergne (2009), the distribution of preferences might 
exacerbate the political business cycle, since the larger fraction of swing voters (voters 
that may vote in two or more parties), the larger incentive to increase the targeted 
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spending before the election, namely, to favor groups with greater electoral relevance. 
Moreover, it is typically observed the increase in expenses in infrastructure projects 
(opportunistic targeted), since these are easier to target due to its geographical and 
sectorial specificity. 
2.4.Empirical results 
In Vergne (2009), both the predictions of the Rogoff’s “visibility expenditure” model and 
the public expenditure targeting model were tested, i.e., if the hypothetical expenditure 
increase will be associated with current, rather than capital expenditure, or if capital 
expenditure will be used as a target to specific groups and locations. The results showed 
that policy makers will prefer to use broad-based spending rather than targeted capital 
spending in electoral years. Moreover, politicians prefer to change the expenditure 
allocation instead of increasing the budget deficit, since voters seem to punish instead of 
reward high deficits. 
Observing 85 different economies between 1975 and 1999, Shi and Svensson (2006) 
concluded that the electoral impact on Government balance is larger in developing 
countries and small or non-existing in industrial countries, and the institutional indicators 
can explain large part of these differences. 
Drazen and Eslava (2008) analyzing 74 countries in the period 1960-2003, tested if voters 
are fiscally conservative or if they punish deficit bias. Indeed, they did not find evidence 
of electoral benefits from fiscal expansions, both in developed and developing countries, 
and in different electoral systems. 
For European countries, as argued by Efthyvoulou (2012), the EMU Member States 
appear to have a statistically more robust political budget cycle than the remaining 
countries. Moreover, the degree of fiscal manipulation in negatively correlated with non-
economic motived voting and positively correlated with the electoral competitiveness. 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) tried to understand if EU countries have used fiscal policy 
instruments to stabilize the business cycle or if policymakers have created political 
business cycles focus in electoral or partisan purposes. The results show that governments 
were focused in pursuit of stabilization policies, to avoid inflation and unemployment 
increases in the 70’s and 80’s. 
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Furthermore, studying the Greek economy in the period 1974-2011, Chortareas et al. 
(2018) realized that despite political budget cycles have subdued after the Maastricht 
treaty, public finances were manipulated in electoral years, with increases in the 
compensation to employees. In addition, the authors concluded that snap elections affect 
expenses, and prolonged incumbencies have a negative influence on both primary balance 
and revenue, regardless the partisan’s orientation/ideology. 
Table 3 provides a brief summary of empirical contributions regarding political budget 
cycles. Accordingly, when compared to previous studies, this paper provides an updated 
and more detailed analysis of the impact on each fiscal instrument and provides insights 





3. Political budget cycles in the Eurozone countries 
The first step of this research is to analyze the average fiscal statistics on the EA19, 
splitting the sample in electoral and non-electoral years. The assessed variables are the 
General Government balance, the CAPB (cyclically adjusted primary balance), debt-to-
GDP ratio, real GDP growth, direct and indirect tax burden, compensation of employees, 
GFKF (gross fixed capital formation) and other current expenditure, which includes all 
the current expenditure excluding the compensation to employees. Data came from the 
AMECO database based on ESA 2010 to provide a more reliable and comparable 




According to Table 2, Eurozone countries have, on average, worst budget balances in 
electoral years, with 0.32 p.p. higher deficits than in the remaining years. 
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Excluding the cyclical effect and the interest expenses, the European countries revealed 
more expansionist policies during electoral periods, presenting a CAPB of -0.13% of 
potential GDP.  
As expected, giving the existing literature, the non-electoral years are used to recover 
savings (average CAPB of 0.30%). However, some doubts arise from the quality of those 
policies, since the average real GDP growth slows down in those years (-0.04 p.p.). 
Consequently, the debt-to-GDP ratio presented an increasing path in both electoral and 
non-electoral years, but with a higher variation in the first case (0.31 p.p.). 
Regarding the other budgetary variables, the direct tax burden appears to have increased 
in the EA19 since 1995, with interruptions facing elections. In the remaining years, direct 
taxes increased, on average, 0.04 p.p. of GDP. The share of indirect taxes on GDP 
decreased about 0.05 p.p. in electoral years (increases at the same rate in the remaining 
years). 
On the expenditure side, compensation to employees tends to increase 0.02 p.p. facing 
elections and to decrease 0.06 otherwise. This path reveals the opposite trends of taxes 
and the civil servants’ wages, that might have led to a wealth deterioration during the last 
decades. The budget manipulation is even higher on the other current expenditure, with 
an average increase of 0.08 p.p. (-0.05 p.p. in the remaining years). 
However, the investment level (gross fixed capital formations) seems to contradict the 
“Public expenditure targeting model”, since it decreases 0.05 p.p. facing elections 
(increases 0.01 p.p. in non-electoral years). A possible reason for this issue is an 
investment delay. In order to target some groups, policy makers might present promises 
of investment in their electoral programs to encourage voters to keep the incumbent party 
in the Government. The Rogoff’s “visibility expenditure” theory appears to be capable to 
explain the budget manipulation in Eurozone countries, evident on the compensation to 
employees and other current expenditure. 
The Table 3 splits the fiscal variables in the year before elections from the remaining 
ones, to assess if the fiscal policy has a different pattern in the eve of elections, namely 






The results are illustrative of the influence that the electoral cycle might have on the fiscal 
policy strategy. When compared to the remaining years, not only the electoral year but 
also the year before elections appears to have some differences in both balance and budget 
composition.  
Firstly, the statistics show that the year before elections use to be the most expansionist 
one. In addition, those are the years where there is a deterioration on the General 
Government Balances (0.1 p.p., on average) and the CAPB decreases 0.16 p.p. However, 
the expansionist policies weren’t applied through a tax decrease or wages increases, but 
by an 8% increase on investment and 7% on other current expenditures. 
On the other hand, in the remaining years, the incumbent uses to create a fiscal buffer, 
with consolidation policies (annual increases of 0.2 p.p. in the CAPB), based on tax 
revenue increases and cuts on public expenditure. 
To understand the role of the indebtedness level in the budget manipulation, Table 4 
presents fiscal statistics separated by thresholds of the debt-to-GDP ratio. The debt levels 
were organized as follows: lower indebted countries have debt ratios lower than 60% 
(complying the Maastricht treaty limits); the highly indebted countries are those that do 
not-comply with the treaty limit but do not have an excessive situation; the excessively 




According to Table 4, less indebted countries tend to reduce the tax burden. As expected, 
the election years are characterized by faster reductions, especially of indirect taxes. On 
the opposite direction, highly indebted countries use to increase the tax burden, but with 
a lower rhythm in elections. Once again, the indirect taxes are more volatile than the direct 
ones, changing on average 0.13 p.p. GDP in non-electoral years (remain unchanged 
during electoral periods). The excessively indebted countries also have an increasing tax 




On the expenditure side, lower indebted countries reveal an expenditure reduction path. 
The exception occurs in electoral years, where the compensation to employees’ level 
remains unchanged, the current expenditures tend to decrease as a percentage of GDP, 
with a higher degree on non-electoral periods. The investment level has a different 
behave, increasing about 0.05 p.p. year-on-year, but falling 0.11 p.p. in elections. 
The highly indebted countries, despite the expenditure decrease path, increase current 
government spending facing elections (0.03 p.p. in compensation to employees and 0.18 
p.p. on other current expenditures). The gross fixed capital formation is expected to 
remain unchanged, but uses to decrease 0.08 p.p. facing elections. 
Lastly, excessively indebted countries present an increasing path regarding other current 
expenditure (reaching 0.18 p.p. variations in electoral periods). Compensation to 
employees increases about 0.04 p.p., decreasing 0.02 p.p. in remaining years. The 
investment reveals a different behavior when compared to the other groups of countries. 
Despite the fast investment reduction (year-on-year change of -0.24 p.p.), the pace slows 
down in electoral years, to -0.07 p.p. 
These statistics didn’t show a clear influence of the indebtedness level on the political 
budget cycles, when the lower and highly indebted countries are compared. The major 
difference comes from the tax burden developments, evidencing the consolidation 
strategies to reduce the debt ratio and to support the interest’s expenses. However, the 
excessively indebted countries reveal a less prudent governance. Indeed, despite the 
prudence observed in non-electoral years, government spending tends to increase in 
elections, specially trough current expenditure. 
Regarding the influence of the participation in the EMU, the sample was divided between 
countries inside the Euro Area, and otherwise. Table 5 presents fiscal statistics before and 




According to the results, both in the EMU and in the non-EMU, fiscal policy seems to be 
less stringent facing electoral years.  
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Countries outside EMU used to decrease the indirect tax burden during electoral years (-
0.09 p.p. of GDP) and to reduce simultaneously government current spending, despite in 
a lower rhythm than in the remaining years (in exemption of the GFKF). The results also 
appear to show a strategy to substitute indirect by direct taxes, during elections. 
After joining the EMU, there was a complete change on fiscal policy in electoral years. 
Both direct and indirect taxes fall (-0.04 and -0.03, respectively) and the current 
expenditures increases.  
Once again, there is a reduction in the investment level as percentage of GDP (-0.13 and 
-0.10 p.p. inside and outside the EMU, respectively). 
4. Estimation results 
In order to capture the effect of the elections on fiscal policy, it was used a typical reduced 
form specification:2 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,              (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes the fiscal (dependent) variables, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 its lagged variable to capture 
the persistence of the fiscal variables. The dummy variable 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 assumes 1 in 
election years and 0 otherwise, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of economic control variables, namely 
the variation of the unemployment rate, the real GDP growth, the debt-to-GDP change in 
t-1, and the real long-term real interest rates. Lastly, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 represents the error term.  
In order to perceive how policy might manipulate the people’s will, expectations and 
perceptions, though fiscal policy in the year before elections (see Table 3), an alternative 
specification was applied to capture the hypothetical influence: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.              (2) 
Furthermore, since the unit-root tests showed that no fiscal variable contains a unit root, 
there was no need to use macro and fiscal variables in differences (Appendix 4).  
A Fixed Effects model was used to assess the impact of fiscal and control variables 
throughout time, assuming that the time-invariant characteristics are country specific. 
Since the Fixed Effects model removes the effect of time-invariant characteristics from 
the predictor variables, it might be a suitable approach. The Hausman test supported this 
                                                          
2 Similar to the observed in Chortareas et al. (2018). 
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assumption, showing that the error term and the constant are not correlated with the other 
variables. Moreover, for all the estimations we have a redundant Fixed Effects Likelihood 
test, where the null hypothesis (no unobserved heterogeneity) was rejected. 
The sample is composed by 19 Eurozone countries (EA19) between 1995 and 2017. The 




According to Table 6, the results not considering (1) and considering (2) the influence of 
the year before elections in fiscal policy are particularly similar. 
As expected, the lagged fiscal variables are all significantly negative.  
In both output (1) and (2) the presence of elections doesn’t seem to influence the presented 
fiscal variables. However, despite not statistically different from zero, it appears to affect 
negatively the primary balance, with a positive sign on primary expenditure and negative 
on revenue. Furthermore, the year before elections isn’t significant to explain fiscal 
policy, but points to a saving orientation, reducing the primary expenditure.  
The real GDP growth influences negatively both expenditure and revenue, but the last 
one in a lower level, since the policy makers are expected to use positive conjunctures to 
apply fiscal consolidations, reducing public spending but diminishing the tax burden at 
the same time.  
The unemployment rate reveals the operation of automatic stabilizers. When it decreases, 
the government revenue increases (due to a tax base increase) and decreases the primary 
expenditure (substitution effect and less social benefits). 
Despite not statistically different from zero, the negative parameter of lagged debt-to-
GDP changes (-0.03) shows a non-Ricardian fiscal regime, since Governments aren’t 
motivated by both stabilization and sustainability goals, i.e., there is no positive response 
of budget balance to a debt stock. This result contradicts the Afonso and Jalles (2019) 
estimates, who argued that advanced economies increase the fiscal primary balances as 
response to debt increases. 
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The long-term real interest rates, representing the cost of public financing, significantly 
induces fiscal consolidations. As expected, it constrains public spending and increases 
the government revenue as an alternative to finance expenditure. 
Since there was a suspicion of reverse causality between the fiscal variables and some 
explanatory variables, as the variation of the long term interest rate or the real GDP 
growth, a IV/GMM estimation was performed for this specification. Following Vergne 
(2019), the instruments used are lagged levels of the dependent variable (two periods) 




Alternative estimates were made using fixed effects for more desegregated fiscal 
variables: direct and indirect taxes, compensation to employees, other current 




The output shows that the cross-section fixed effects method is justified, since the result 
of the Redundant Fixed Effects Test rejects the null hypothesis. The selected 
macroeconomic variables appear to only explain other current expenditure’s variations 
robustly, with R-squares of 0.74-0.75. 
According to the results, the presence of the year before elections only changes the impact 
of the electoral dummies on the fiscal policy. Whilst in (1) the electoral period increases 
the share of both compensations to employees (0.09) and other current expenditure (0.20) 
on GDP (statistically significant), in (2) it influences the compensation to employees 
(0.09) and the GFKF (-0.10). The year before elections is significant (-0.23) for other 
current expenditure. 
Moreover, the tax burden is negatively influenced by unemployment, which shows the 
impact of the tax base increase. In addition, the indirect tax burden also depends on the 
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real GDP growth (negatively) and shows a Ricardian fiscal behave, since it tends to 
increase in response to a debt increase in the previous year. 
On the current expenditures, both compensation to employees (significant in both (1) and 
(2)) and other current expenditure (1) tend to increase during electoral years. Furthermore, 
the other current expenditures tend to decrease in the year before elections. Concerning 
the compensation to employees, the positive unemployment correlations and negative 
parameters of GDP growth reveal a substitution effect. The financing cost and the lagged 
debt shocks also play a role, constraining public spending. 
The gross fixed capital formation depends on the liquidity constrains. It shows a Ricardian 
fiscal behave facing lagged debt increases and is constrained by the long-run real interest 
rates. As presented in Table 3, it tends to decrease in electoral years. 
The Table 8 estimation was repeated using the IV/GMM estimator. Table 9 shows that, 




The only significant difference arises precisely from the electoral dummies. The electoral 
years lost their ability to significantly explain compensation to employees and investment, 
and became statistically significant to explain (positively) other current expenditures. In 
addition, the year before elections lost the negative impact on the other current 
expenditures. 
Moving forward, to better understand how the indebted level might influence the policy 
maker’s ability to manipulate fiscal instruments during elections, an estimation was 
performed splitting the most from the least indebted countries, i.e., those who comply (or 
not) the Maastricht Treaty limit of 60% GDP. 





The Redundant Fixed Effects test stills rejecting the null hypothesis, justifying the use of 
fixed effects estimator.  
Comparing to Table 8, the selected exogenous variables have a stronger ability to explain 
current expenditure variations (R-Square of 0.82 and 0.71, in outputs 1 and 2, 
respectively). 
According to Table 10, the electoral influence on the fiscal policy seems to differ from 
low and highly indebted countries. Whilst, in countries with debt ratios above 60% of 
GDP, policy makers tend to manipulate compensation to employees with electoral 
purposes, the same do not happen for lower indebted countries, or at least, the parameter 
isn’t statistically significant. In both (1) and (2) estimations, the other current 
expenditures seem to decrease in the year before elections. 
Comparing the two groups of countries, one might conclude that highly indebted 
countries use to conduct tax policies according to the macro variables, being more volatile 
facing cyclical fluctuations. Whilst, the lower indebted countries (1) only the direct tax 
burden tends to increase facing an unemployment decrease (tax base increase), the most 
indebted ones (2) decrease the overall tax burden when the economy is growing, as well 
as the indirect taxes when the unemployment falls. Also, the tax burden increases in 
response to a real long-term interest rate shock, representing an alternative financing 
source. 
The compensation to employees decreases facing both growth accelerations and interest 
rates increases. Moreover, it shows a Ricardian response facing debt shocks in the 
previous year in (2) and increases due to electoral purposes in (1).  
On the other current expenditure, the fiscal policy response isn’t very different between 
estimates, decreasing in the year before elections. Despite doesn’t react in a Ricardian 
way facing debt shocks, it reacts counter-cyclically facing economic growth. In the highly 
indebted countries, it seems to reduce facing interest shocks.  
 Furthermore, in both cases, the GFKF negative responses to interest rate shocks, not 
being influenced by electoral year (despite the negative parameters, they aren’t 
statistically significant), neither by the precedent years. 
Giving the pro-cyclical tax burden, the electoral impact on the compensation to 
employees and the absence of a Ricardian fiscal regime, its perceived a less prudent and 
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stringent Governance of the highly indebted EMU countries, when compared to the 
remaining Member States. Moreover, the fiscal policy is dependent on the financing 
conditions, since all the fiscal instruments are sensitive to real long-term interest rate 
variations.   
To understand the influence of the Eurozone membership on political budget cycles, an 




According to Table 11, elections only influenced (significantly) compensation to 
employees when countries had not yet joined the EMU (0.22). However, the year before 
seems to influence all the fiscal variables inside the monetary union and all parameters 
are statistically different from zero.  
Apparently, EMU policy makers use to increase government revenue and decrease 
expenditure one year before elections in order to save sufficient margin to apply more 
expansionist policies next year. In fact, despite not significant, all the variables seem to 
invert the sign from one year to the other. 
Contrary to the first sub-sample, before joining the Eurozone, only the compensation to 
employees and the GFKF changed their path in electoral periods.  
Regarding the responses to economic growth accelerations, only the other current 
expenditure seems to significantly react, decreasing 0.18 and 0.41 in EMU and non-EMU 
countries, respectively. Facing unemployment rate decreases, both estimations revealed 
an increase on current expenditures, but also an increase on indirect tax burden on the 
Member States. 
Furthermore, both (1) and (2) doesn’t show any Ricardian response to a debt shock in t-
1, and countries seem to become more sensitive to interest rate shocks after joining the 
Eurozone. Whilst when countries had an autonomous monetary policy only the 
compensation to employees reduced with higher financing costs and the direct taxes even 
decreased, tax burden is forced to increase since then (despite only indirect taxes is 




To perform a robustness test, a new fixed effects specification was performed using the 
elections’ dummy variable to distinguish the influence of the macroeconomic control 
variables on the fiscal instruments. The goal is to understand how fiscal instruments might 
react in a different way in the presence of an electoral year. 
Thus, the specification is: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 X (𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡) + (1 − 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) X  (𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
In addition to the baseline estimation (1), four additional estimations would be made, 
splitting the sample in countries with a debt ratio under (2) and above (3) 60% of GDP, 
and inside (4) and outside (5) the EMU. 






Giving the Tables 9 and 10 (output 1), one might conclude that the real GDP growth has 
a similar impact on primary balance during electoral and non-electoral years (0.18 – 0.20). 
In addition, the incumbent Government tends to deteriorate the primary balance facing 
unemployment increases (-0.67). During non-electoral periods, use the policy makers use 
to improve the balance when there is an increase in financing costs and reveal a non-
Ricardian response facing a debt increase in the previous year. Thus, the Wald Test might 
reveal the relevance of the budgetary performance and debt control for electoral proposes 
in the EMU, reflecting the increasing voter’s concern regarding the high amounts of 
public debt accumulated during the last decades, and the consequent costs on people’s 
income and welfare. 
Regarding the revenue, during electoral periods, it tends to increase in response to debt 
shocks (0.05), showing the Ricardian behavior of policy makers. As expected, 
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government revenue also increases facing falls on unemployment rate (0.06), due to the 
increase of the tax base and the decrease of social benefits.  
However, the result is different in the absence of elections, where just the real GDP 
growth seems to be statistically significant (-0.11), since the government might use a 
positive economic moment to reduce taxes. 
On the primary expenditure side, it decreases facing a faster economic growth (-0.52 
during elections, -0.40 if not), and increases facing debt shocks (0.06), but only in the 
absence of elections. Moreover, despite not significantly different from zero, the Wald 
test showed that unemployment rate decreases have a more negative impact on 
government spending (substitution effect) in electoral years. 
Comparing the results for countries with stocks of public debt under (2) and above (3) 
60% of GDP, one can see that the inference of fiscal instruments on primary balance, isn’t 
particularly different in terms of sign, but on the statistical significance and magnitude. 
On the primary balance, and during electoral periods, the only significant difference is on 
the response to unemployment, having a stronger and statistically reaction in the less 
indebted countries (-0.73 against -0.59).  
During the remaining period, the result inverts and the most indebted counties have a 
higher response (-0.94 against -0.23) to employment falls. Furthermore, whilst the less 
indebted countries use to deteriorate the primary balance facing increases on the 
indebtedness level (-0.11) and to improve it in response to a stronger economic growth 
(0.26), the same seems not happen in the counterfactual group.  
On the revenue side, the only significant variables during elections are the lagged change 
on the debt ratio and the unemployment rate in the lowest indebted countries (0.10 and -
0.15, respectively) and the interest rate in the most indebted ones (0.13). In the remaining 
period, both groups have negative responses to economic growth, but continues to exhibit 
different sign facing changes on the unemployment rate. When it falls, the Government 
revenue tends to increase in (2) (0.11) and decrease in (3) (-0.06). 
Lastly, on the expenditure side, the signs of the significant parameters are similar for 
countries with debt rations under and above 60% GDP, decreasing primary spending 
facing economic growth shocks (both in elections and in the remaining period). 
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Furthermore, in non-electoral years, the lower indebted countries appear to have a non-




Table 14 shows that selected variables have a stronger ability to explain fiscal policy 
changes in countries outside the monetary union than to explain in the EMU member 
states, having a higher R-squares. 
Comparing the estimations (4) and (5), one can observe that primary balances have 
different kind of responses to macroeconomic variables, depending on the EMU 
membership.  
Facing elections, whilst the EMU member states use to improve their primary balances 
facing economic growth accelerations (0.33) and debt increases (0.11), the response is 
negative (despite not statistically significant) in the non-EMU countries.  
In non-electoral years, the expansionist response to unemployment lose its significance 
outside the Eurozone, the economic growth became significant and there is a non-
Ricardian behavior facing a debt increase. Inside the EMU, the Ricardian response ceased 
to be observed and the response to interest rate shock became statistically significant. 
Observing the revenue and expenditure variations, the major difference found is on the 
revenue response to an interest rate shock. Once again, contrary to what happens in the 
non-Eurozone countries, the Member States use to increase their tax burden when the 
financing costs are higher, since don’t have the ability to manipulate monetary policy to 
reduce it. This effect is only statistically significant during elections (+0.11 p.p. in 
Government revenue). 
Furthermore, in non-election years, non-EMU countries use to increase their primary 







This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in the Eurozone. Taking into 
account the influence of the debt level and of the Monetary Union on policy taking, we 
studied the impact of elections on fiscal policy. After a first statistical analysis, using 
annual data from 19 Eurozone Member States between 1995 and 2017 and a time dummy 
to identify electoral periods, it was applied a Fixed Effects model to assess its impact on 
fiscal variables, controlling the response to other macroeconomic variables’ shocks, such 
as the unemployment, economic growth, debt variations or interest rates. 
According to the results, the electoral period seems to increase the share of both 
compensations to employees and other current expenditure on GDP, being the last one 
also affected on the year before the elections. Corroborating with Vergne (2009) and the 
predictions of the Rogoff’s “visibility expenditure” model, it shows that policy makers 
prefer to use current spending rather than target capital spending in electoral years. 
Since there was a suspicion of reverse causality problems, a IV/GMM estimation was 
performed for this specification, whose output showed very similar results. The only 
significant difference arises from the electoral dummies, where the electoral years lost 
the ability to significantly explain compensation to employees and investment, and 
became statistically significant to explain (positively) other current expenditures. In 
addition, the year before elections lost the negative impact on the other current 
expenditures. 
Furthermore, the electoral influence on the fiscal policy seems to differ from low and 
highly indebted countries. Whilst, in countries with debt ratios above 60% of GDP, policy 
makers tend to influence the compensations to employees with electoral purposes, the 
same does not seem to happen in the case of the less indebted countries.  
Moreover, countries that are more indebted countries use to decrease the overall tax 
burden when the economy is growing, as well as the indirect taxes when the 
unemployment falls. Also, the tax burden increases in response to a real long-term interest 
rate shock, representing an alternative financing source. 
Thus, given the pro-cyclical tax burden, the electoral impact on the compensation to 
employees and the absence of a Ricardian fiscal regime, its perceived a less prudent fiscal 
policy from the most indebted countries, when compared to the remaining Member States. 
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In addition, the fiscal policy is highly dependent on the financing conditions, since all the 
fiscal instruments are sensitive to real long-term interest rate variations. 
Assessing if the primary balance might response differently to macroeconomic changes 
during the electoral period, the estimates have shown that in the absence of elections, the 
incumbent Government tends to improve its balance facing real interest rate shocks but 
also to deteriorate facing debt increases (contrarily to electoral years), neglecting the 
relevance of fiscal discipline without electoral purposes. Also, decreases on 
unemployment rate and growth rate accelerations influence positively the primary 
balance, in both groups. 
Lastly, comparing fiscal responses to macro shocks before and after countries joined the 
EMU, it was perceived that policy makers started to increase tax burden facing interest 
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Appendix 1  
Table 1 – Empirical results in the related literature: summary 
 
Authors (year) Methodology Sample Period Main Results
Gonzales (2002) Pooled OLS Mexico 1957-1999
 - The elections affect infrastructure spending and 
transfers, which gets stronger under higher level of 
democracy.
Andrikopoulos et al. 
(2004) 
ARMA EU countries 1970-1998
 - The great majority of the results suggest that the 
national governments of the EU countries did not 
take policy actions leading to the creation of 
electoral or partisan cycles in fiscal instruments and 
target variables;
 -  The EU governments have been primarily 
concerned with the pursuit of stabilization policies 
rather than with policies giving rise to political 
cycles.
Brender and Drazen 
(2005)
Fixed Effects (FE) 106 countries 1960-2001
 - There are evidences of political budget cycles, but 
only in new democracies.







 -There is a pre-electoral increase in targeted 
expenditures, and voters use to respond positively.
Shi and Svensson 
(2006)
GMM 85 countries 1975-1995
 - Policital budget cycles effect is large in developing 
countries and small or non-existing in industrial 
countries, and the institutional indicators can explain 
large part of these differences.
Brender and Drazen 
(2008)
LOGIT 74 countries 1960-2003
 -  In developed countries and established 
democracies, election-year deficit spending and tax 
cuts are punished at the polls. A worsening of the 
government’s fiscal balance in the election year 
actually reduces the probability that the leader is 
reelected;
 - In most countries loose fiscal policies over the 
incumbent’s term of office, reflected in larger 
budget deficits relative to earlier periods, are 
associated with a statistically significant lower 
probability of reelection;
 - The real growth rate (per capita) is associated with 
a higher probability of reelection only in the less 
developed countries and in the new democracies.




 - Politicians shift the composition of pre-election 
spending towards current expenditure and away 
from capital expenditure;
 - They prefer to use broad-based rather than 
targeted spending at election times;
 - While political budget cycles disappear as the 
Government has more experience, the electoral 







 - Elections shift public spending towards current 
expenditures at the cost of public investment;
 - The is no evidence for na electoral cycle for both 
deficit and overall expenditures;
 - Endogenous elections seems to increase deficit, 
but not changing the composition of fiscal policy.





 - Facing elections, primary balance deteriorates via 
inceased expenditures, where compensation to 
employees use to increase;
 - Prolonged incumbencies affect negatively the 
primary balance and revenues;





Table 2– Fiscal statistics in electoral years (EA19 average: 1995-2017) 
  
Sources: AMECO and author’s calculations. 
Note: All the figures are presented in percentage of GDP and growth represents the real GDP 




Table 3 - Fiscal statistics in the year before elections (EA19 average: 1995-2017) 
 
Sources: AMECO and author’s calculations. 
Note: All the figures are presented in percentage of GDP and growth represents the real GDP annual 




Variable Electoral Non-Electioral Difference
Balance -3.05 -2.73 -0.32
Δ Balance 0.20 0.25 -0.05
CAPB -0.13 0.30 -0.43
ΔCAPB -0.04 0.08 -0.12
Δ Debt 1.25 0.94 0.31
Growth 2.66 2.70 -0.04
Δ Direct Taxes 0.01 0.04 -0.03
Δ Indirect Taxes -0.05 0.05 -0.10
Δ Compensation to Employees 0.03 -0.06 0.09
Δ GFKF -0.05 0.01 -0.06
Δ Other Current Expenditure 0.06 -0.05 0.11
Nº Observations 114 323
Variable Electoral Year before Other
Balance -3.05 -3.13 -2.37
Δ Balance 0.20 -0.10 0.31
CAPB -0.13 -0.12 0.50
ΔCAPB -0.04 -0.16 0.20
Δ Debt 1.25 1.13 0.91
Growth 2.66 2.71 2.70
Δ Direct Taxes 0.01 0.08 0.03
Δ Indirect Taxes -0.05 0.06 0.05
Δ Compensation to Employees 0.03 -0.09 -0.04
Δ GFKF -0.05 0.08 -0.02
Δ Other Current Expenditure 0.06 0.07 -0.11
Nº Observations 114 106 217
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Table 4 – Fiscal statistics by debt-to-GDP ratio (EA19 average: 1995-2017) 
 
Sources: AMECO and author’s calculations. 
Note: All the figures are presented in percentage of GDP.  




Table 5 – Fiscal statistics in EMU (EA19 average: 1995-2017) 
 
Sources: AMECO and author’s calculations. 
Note: All the figures are presented in percentage of GDP.  









Electoral Non-Elect. Electoral Non-Elect. Electoral Non-Elect.
Δ Direct Taxes -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.12 -0.02 0.05
Δ Indirect Taxes -0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.14
Δ Compensation to Employees 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.02
Δ GFKF -0.11 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.24
Δ Other Current Expenditure -0.03 -0.04 0.18 -0.12 0.18 0.04
Nº Observations 54 153 41 116 19 54
100%>Debt >60% Debt >100%GDPDebt <60%GDP
Variable
Total Electoral Non-Elect. Total Electoral Non-Elect.
Δ Direct Taxes 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.08
Δ Indirect Taxes 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.14
Δ Compensation to Employees -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08
Δ GFKF -0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.05
Δ Other Current Expenditure 0.04 0.18 -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.14






Table 6 – Baseline output  
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 
and * respectively (value of the t statistic in parentheses).  
 
Table 7 – Baseline output (IV/GMM)  
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 
and * respectively (value of the t statistic in parentheses). The instruments used are lagged levels of the 











-0.586*** 9.625*** 19.05*** -0.627*** 9.689*** 19.11***
(-2.841) (7.886) (11.83) (-2.721) (7.877) (11.87)
0.518*** -0.220*** -0.428*** 0.519*** -0.221*** -0.427***
(10.73) (-7.675) (-11.15) (10.71) (-7.679) (-11.13)
-0.263 -0.116 0.105 -0.229 -0.134 0.025 
(-1.035) (-0.951) (0.434) (-0.857) (-1.045) (0.098)
0.109 -0.059 -0.266 
(0.405) (-0.460) (-1.036)
0.189*** -0.142*** -0.355*** 0.190*** -0.143*** -0.358***
(4.174) (-6.480) (-8.212) (4.188) (-6.488) (-8.270)
-0.529*** -0.184*** 0.285*** -0.528*** -0.185*** 0.282***
(-4.974) (-3.576) (2.812) (-4.950) (-3.588) (2.781)
-0.031 0.015 0.028 -0.031 0.015 0.028 
(-1.104) (1.465) (1.104) (-1.082) (1.469) (1.100)
0.115*** 0.037* -0.071* 0.115*** 0.036* -0.072*
(2.642) (1.771) (-1.712) (2.649) (1.759) (-1.740)
N 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2 0.66 0.29 0.46 0.66 0.29 0.47
Prob (F-stat.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t-stat. 2.30 3.28 4.41 2.30 3.29 4.37
p-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00


























-0.582*** 9.580*** 19.11*** -0.403 9.552*** 19.19***
(-2.795) (7.769) (11.79) (-1.252) (7.564) (11.79)
0.525*** -0.219*** -0.430*** 0.515*** -0.219*** -0.433***
(10.80) (-7.583) (-11.14) (10.17) (-7.505) (-11.06)
-0.288 -0.134 0.120 -0.858 -0.028 0.405 
(-1.124) (-1.103) (0.494) (-1.282) (-0.089) (0.649)
-0.094 -0.014 -0.133 
(-0.281) (-0.091) (-0.422)
0.196*** -0.134*** -0.354*** 0.195*** -0.134*** -0.357***
(4.260) (-6.040) (-8.082) (4.172) (-6.004) (-8.079)
-0.519*** -0.184*** 0.270*** -0.521*** -0.184*** 0.267***
(-4.802) (-3.529) (2.629) (-4.770) (-3.525) (2.592)
-0.025 0.015 0.025 -0.029 0.015 0.026 
(-0.867) (1.430) (0.954) (-0.985) (1.435) (1.005)
0.118*** 0.049** -0.061 0.118*** 0.049** -0.062 
(2.642) (2.299) (-1.430) (2.617) (2.281) (-1.448)
N 365 365 365 365 365 365
R2 0.66 0.29 0.47 0.65 0.29 0.46
Δ Debt-to-GDP 
Ratio (-1)















Table 8– Estimation by instrument 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9– Estimation by instrument (IV/GMM) 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 
and * respectively (value of the t statistic in parentheses). The instruments used are lagged levels of the 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10– Estimation by debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11– Estimation by EMU membership 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12– Robustness Estimation (Debt) 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































β1 - δ1 = 0 Real GDP Growth 0.16 0.87
β2 - δ2 = 0 Δ Unemployment Rate -0.75 0.46
β3 - δ3 = 0 Δ Debt-to-GDP t-1 2.75 0.01
β4 - δ4 = 0 Real LT Interest Rate -0.36 0.72
t-stat. p-val.
β1 - δ1 = 0 Real GDP Growth 2.48 0.01
β2 - δ2 = 0 Δ Unemployment Rate -2.48 0.01
β3 - δ3 = 0 Δ Debt-to-GDP t-1 1.83 0.07
β4 - δ4 = 0 Real LT Interest Rate 1.06 0.29
t-stat. p-val.
β1 - δ1 = 0 Real GDP Growth -1.56 0.12
β2 - δ2 = 0 Δ Unemployment Rate 2.04 0.04
β3 - δ3 = 0 Δ Debt-to-GDP t-1 -2.03 0.04










Table 14 – Robustness Estimation (EMU) 
 
Note: The impacts are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, according to the classification ***, ** 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Country Electoral Years Nº of Elections Heads of Government Type
Belgium 1995; 1999; 2004; 2007; 2009; 2010; 2014 7 Prime-Minister Federal
Germany 1998; 2002; 2005; 2009; 2013; 2017 6 Chancellor Federal
Estonia 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 6 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Ireland 1997; 2002; 2007; 2011; 2016 5 Prime-Minister General Elections
Greece 1996; 2000; 2004; 2007; 2009; 2012; 2015 7 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Spain 1996; 2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2015; 2016 7 Prime-Minister General Elections
France 1997;2002; 2007, 2012; 2017 5 President Presidential
Italy 1996; 2001; 2006; 2008; 2013 5 President General Elections
Cyprus 1998; 2003; 2008; 2013 4 President Presidential
Latvia 1995; 1998; 2002; 2006; 2010; 2011; 2014 7 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Lithuania 1996; 2000; 2004; 2008; 2012; 2016 6 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Luxembourg 1999; 2004; 2009; 2013 4 Prime-Minister General Elections
Malta 1996; 1998; 2003; 2008; 2013; 2017 6 Prime-Minister General Elections
Netherlands 1998; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2017 7 Prime-Minister General Elections
Austria 1995; 1999; 2002; 2006; 2008; 2013; 2017 7 Chancellor Parliamentary
Portugal 1995; 1999; 2002; 2005; 2009; 2011; 2015 7 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Slovenia 1996, 2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; 2014 6 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Slovakia 1998; 2002; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2016 6 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
Finland 1995; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015 6 Prime-Minister Parliamentary
STATISTICS Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Kurtosis Observ.
Balance -2.75 -2.55 6.86 -32.06 3.69 -1.52 437
Primary balance -0.05 0.16 9.57 -29.23 3.45 14.9 437
Debt 60.62 58.88 178.91 3.66 35.93 3.28 437
Real GDP growth 2.72 2.74 25.12 -14.81 3.68 9.13 437
Unemployment rate 9.22 8.40 27.50 1.90 4.45 5.19 435
Real LT interest rate 2.35 2.07 24.40 -12.35 3.33 13.39 396
Direct taxes 10.91 10.59 20.47 4.35 3.15 2.35 437
Indirect Taxes 12.89 12.86 17.15 8.45 1.63 2.45 437
Compensation to employees 10.94 10.87 15.00 7.03 1.82 2.19 437
GFKF 3.58 3.68 6.32 1.55 1.03 2.51 437
Other current expenditure 28.81 28.93 39.70 14.00 5.96 1.94 437
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Appendix 4  
Table A4 – Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: The values are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.. Levin, Lin & Chu t method for 
common unit root process, and Fisher tests for individual unit root process. 
 
Variable Method Statistic Prob. Obs
Levin, Lin & Chu t -2.03 0.02
Fisher 87.21 0.00
Levin, Lin & Chu t -2.69 0.00
Fisher 74.56 0.00
Levin, Lin & Chu t -2.06 0.02
Fisher 59.86 0.01
Levin, Lin & Chu t -1.05 0.15
Fisher 52.06 0.06
Levin, Lin & Chu t -4.08 0.00
Fisher 76.11 0.00
Levin, Lin & Chu t -1.58 0.06
Fisher 63.46 0.01
Levin, Lin & Chu t -3.45 0.00
Fisher 68.97 0.00
Levin, Lin & Chu t -2.06 0.02
Fisher 75.05 0.00
Levin, Lin & Chu t -0.97 0.16
Fisher 51.76 0.07
Levin, Lin & Chu t -2.45 0.01
Fisher 65.99 0.00
399
399
399
399
Other C. Expendiutre
Primary Balance
Revenue
Prim. Expenditure
399
399
399
399
399
399
Balance
CAPB
Direct Taxes
Indirect Taxes
Compensation to 
Employees
GFKF
